Dissecting and Dismantling Rauser's Definition of Faith
Randal Rauser repeatedly tells us that "Faith consists of assent to a proposition that is conceivably false." I have repeatedly said that faith is an irrational leap over the probabilities, and as such, we should think exclusively in terms of probabilities. He claims I'm ignorant. Okay then, let's see. Rauser's definition is a Christian language game utterly irrelevant to whether Christianity is true, because it forces him to choose between being a skeptic, a non-believer, and beyond this an epistemological solipsist, or he is forced to admit we should think exclusively in terms of probabilities after all.
Now it's probably true that everything we think we know is conceivably false. Rauser uses this to say we all have faith, that faith is a part of knowledge itself. Will the sun rise tomorrow morning? There is faith involved since it's conceivably false that it won't. Is my mother my real mother? There is faith involved since it's conceivably false that she isn't. Something that is conceivably false with regard to these things is merely possible, not probable. Anyone who goes beyond the probabilities is not being rational. Of course the sun will rise tomorrow morning. Of course my mother is my mother. I could be wrong. So what? Probability is all that matters. Faith adds nothing to my calculations at all.
The really intriguing cases have to do with a host of hypothetical scenarios, the ones Rauser focuses on. Am I really typing these words in September of 2012? There is faith involved since it's conceivably false that I'm not. [For all we know, twenty years from now a mad scientist may have extracted my brain at night, kept it alive, and is pouring chemicals over it right now causing me to remember typing these words twenty years ago.] There are a host of scenarios like these. Perhaps I'm dreaming right now. Perhaps there isn't a physical universe. Perhaps our universe is nothing more than a raindrop in thunderstorm taking place in a much larger duplicate universe. Perhaps we're living in the Matrix. Perhaps. Perhaps.
I have argued that none of these hypothetical scenarios are probable, but that's beside the point right now. Let's call these scenarios possible explanations for our mundane experience of life. Rauser claims that anyone who assents to the proposition that they are probably false has faith. But what Rauser has failed to provide in his definition is the continuum by which he judges something as conceivably false. Is everything conceivably false to the same degree? Or, are there some things that have more or less probability to them that should be placed on a continuum of doubt?
So he has a choice to make. Either a) he must say there is no way at all to judge the probabilities of these scenarios, that any of them are equally probable including the probability of our mundane experience of life, or b) he must admit he's thinking exclusively in terms of the probabilities with regard to these scenarios after all. In either case, Rauser doesn't have a soapbox to preach on, for it follows that (a) requires that Rauser should be a skeptic, a real skeptic, a non-believer, and beyond this an epistemological solipsist, while (b) dispenses with the need for, and the value of, faith itself.
So in the end Rauser is playing a Christian language game, one that no one needs to accept.
But wait! Don't change the channel. There's more.
Let's say we are living in the Matrix. It still doesn't change the fact that we should think exclusively in terms of the probabilities inside the Matrix. Even if I'm dreaming it still doesn't change the fact that I should think in terms of the probabilities inside my dream world. If it does change this, and if everything is up for grabs with no way to assess any probabilities at all, then we might as well shoot ourselves in the head. Hey, what's the probability we'll die? What's the probability the bullet will fire? We might just be dreaming. And we might as well rob a bank. Hey, why not? What's the probability we might get away with it? What if we're brains in the vat and we already got away with it, or we already paid the price in prison twenty years ago? What difference does it make now?
So even if we're inside the Matrix, dreaming, or brains in a vat, we should still assess Christianity based on the probabilities. Probabilities are all that matter. We should still think exclusively in terms of them. Faith adds nothing to them, nothing at all, even if we live in a Matrix or are dreaming right now. So Rauser's definition of faith is also utterly irrelevant to whether Christianity is true. It's a Christian language game pure and simple.
Now it's probably true that everything we think we know is conceivably false. Rauser uses this to say we all have faith, that faith is a part of knowledge itself. Will the sun rise tomorrow morning? There is faith involved since it's conceivably false that it won't. Is my mother my real mother? There is faith involved since it's conceivably false that she isn't. Something that is conceivably false with regard to these things is merely possible, not probable. Anyone who goes beyond the probabilities is not being rational. Of course the sun will rise tomorrow morning. Of course my mother is my mother. I could be wrong. So what? Probability is all that matters. Faith adds nothing to my calculations at all.
The really intriguing cases have to do with a host of hypothetical scenarios, the ones Rauser focuses on. Am I really typing these words in September of 2012? There is faith involved since it's conceivably false that I'm not. [For all we know, twenty years from now a mad scientist may have extracted my brain at night, kept it alive, and is pouring chemicals over it right now causing me to remember typing these words twenty years ago.] There are a host of scenarios like these. Perhaps I'm dreaming right now. Perhaps there isn't a physical universe. Perhaps our universe is nothing more than a raindrop in thunderstorm taking place in a much larger duplicate universe. Perhaps we're living in the Matrix. Perhaps. Perhaps.
I have argued that none of these hypothetical scenarios are probable, but that's beside the point right now. Let's call these scenarios possible explanations for our mundane experience of life. Rauser claims that anyone who assents to the proposition that they are probably false has faith. But what Rauser has failed to provide in his definition is the continuum by which he judges something as conceivably false. Is everything conceivably false to the same degree? Or, are there some things that have more or less probability to them that should be placed on a continuum of doubt?
So he has a choice to make. Either a) he must say there is no way at all to judge the probabilities of these scenarios, that any of them are equally probable including the probability of our mundane experience of life, or b) he must admit he's thinking exclusively in terms of the probabilities with regard to these scenarios after all. In either case, Rauser doesn't have a soapbox to preach on, for it follows that (a) requires that Rauser should be a skeptic, a real skeptic, a non-believer, and beyond this an epistemological solipsist, while (b) dispenses with the need for, and the value of, faith itself.
So in the end Rauser is playing a Christian language game, one that no one needs to accept.
But wait! Don't change the channel. There's more.
Let's say we are living in the Matrix. It still doesn't change the fact that we should think exclusively in terms of the probabilities inside the Matrix. Even if I'm dreaming it still doesn't change the fact that I should think in terms of the probabilities inside my dream world. If it does change this, and if everything is up for grabs with no way to assess any probabilities at all, then we might as well shoot ourselves in the head. Hey, what's the probability we'll die? What's the probability the bullet will fire? We might just be dreaming. And we might as well rob a bank. Hey, why not? What's the probability we might get away with it? What if we're brains in the vat and we already got away with it, or we already paid the price in prison twenty years ago? What difference does it make now?
So even if we're inside the Matrix, dreaming, or brains in a vat, we should still assess Christianity based on the probabilities. Probabilities are all that matter. We should still think exclusively in terms of them. Faith adds nothing to them, nothing at all, even if we live in a Matrix or are dreaming right now. So Rauser's definition of faith is also utterly irrelevant to whether Christianity is true. It's a Christian language game pure and simple.
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